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Ian joined Informa (formerly UBM) in 2018 as the Editor of SHP. Ian studied journalism at university before spending seven years in online fantasy gaming.
Prior to moving to Informa, Ian worked in business to business trade print media, in the automotive sector. He was Online Editor and then moved on to be the Editor of two publications aimed at independent automotive technicians and parts distributors.
February 19, 2021
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Grenfell Tower fire: Government pledges additional £3.5bn to tackle cladding crisis
In February 2021, SHP and IFSEC Global spoke to Gill Kernick, Master Consultant at JMJ Associates, and former Grenfell resident. Moving out three years before the tragedy in 2017, she has been a high-profile voice on the subject. In this episode of the Safety & Health Podcast, Gill talks about about the pressing need to improve building safety and prevent low probability, high consequence events – such as Grenfell – from happening again.
Inquiry suspended following UK lockdown
Following Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s announcement of a third nationwide lockdown to combat rising coronavirus cases, the Inquiry was once again suspended until at least February. The restart was planned for 11 January after a Christmas break, but the move now threatens to delay its conclusions until 2022.
In what was described as a ‘sinister’ revelation, the Public Inquiry heard evidence that the companies involved in manufacturing Grenfell Tower’s cladding ‘abused testing regimes… deliberately misled customers about the performance of their products and circumvented regulations with clever marketing’.
As reported in The Guardian, Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan, which made the cladding sheets, combustible foam insulation and remaining insulation respectively, were all found by lawyers to have either misled testers or ignored compliance which distorted the full-scale fire tests of materials. The three companies ‘strongly dispute the claims’, and each appeared to blame each other, as well as external factors such as the competency of the construction professionals. Three executives of Arconic are refusing to attend the Inquiry.
Remediation works to remove and replace unsafe cladding update
Remediation works to remove and replace unsafe Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) cladding systems have either completed or started on 77% (351) of all identified high-rise residential and publicly owned buildings in England, according to a report. An increase of 10 since the end of August.
Other headlines from the release include the following:
236 buildings (52% of all identified buildings) no longer have ACM cladding systems – an increase of five since the end of August. 189 (41% of all buildings) have fully completed remediation – an increase of 22 since the end of August;
Of those with ACM cladding remaining, a further 115 have started remediation. Of the 105 yet to start, eight are vacant and 80 occupied buildings have a remediation plan in place;
95% (148) of social sector buildings have either completed or started remediation. 74% of the 155 buildings have removed the ACM cladding, with 84 (54%) having completed remediation;
61% (127) of private sector buildings have either completed or started remediation. Of these, 60 have had their ACM cladding removed.
Cladding firm did not check the design met fire safety requirements
Ray Bailey, Director of Harley Facades, has told the Grenfell Tower Inquiry that the firm relied on architects and building control officers to make sure designs were safe and that the company itself did not check the safety of the cladding which was used during the Grenfell Tower refurbishment.
He accused supplier Celotex of misleading his firm about its safety, stating that he felt his firm was deceived that the insulation used on the project was safe for high-rises.
He said Polyisocyanurate (PIR) foam rigid insulation boards became widely used in construction around a decade ago.
During the inquiry, Mr Bailey was asked about how much he knew about their fire risk, he said: “When we were asked to use Celotex on Grenfell Tower, we were of the mindset that these new special super duper insulation products were acceptable providing they met certain criteria.
“Celotex made a big, big deal about their products being suitable, specifically designed for building over 18 metres.
“They used the term, which is very misleading now looking back, ‘Class 0 throughout’.”
A Class 0 fire safety certificate is the minimum requirement for external surfaces of buildings.
Mr Bailey said: “I think we carried out all possible reasonable checks… we didn’t believe for one second that they would attempt to mislead us on this.”
The Inquiry into the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire resumed on Monday 7 September on a ‘limited attendance’ basis, with two witnesses set to be able to give evidence on one day via approved ‘modifications’, as reported by the Fire Protection Association.
The second phase began with hearings delayed due to witnesses asking for a guarantee from Attorney General Geoffrey Cox that they will be protected when they give evidence and that anything they say in the hearings will not be used for any prosecution. This was granted and later extended. At the time, the inquiry’s Chief Lawyer, Richard Millett QC, said each claimed what happened was “someone else’s fault”. This is despite widespread expert opinion that the work failed to meet building regulations.
After resuming post COVID-19 suspension, the first week heard a senior fire engineer ‘did not raise the need for any proposed cladding system to have a separate fire safety assessment’, while another was sent the cladding design report but didn’t view it. Two fire consultants gave ‘no thought’ to evacuating disabled residents; Studio E and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea clashed over fire safety; another consultant ‘had no clue that cladding was part of the plans’; and a Studio E architect said no drawing records were kept and aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding was the ‘cheaper option’.
Grenfell main contractor ‘ignored’ cladding fears warning
A senior figure at the main contractor responsible for the refurbishment work at Grenfell Tower ‘ignored’ email concerns that the cladding could be combustible, the inquiry has been told.
Claire Williams from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) firm running the tower sent an email to Rydon’s Simon Lawrence on 12 November 2014 asking for clarity on whether the cladding selected for the refurbishment would resist fire.
A fire safety expert who worked on the project to clad Grenfell Tower in 2012 has said that the plans presented no “particular issues or problems” when it came to fire safety.
Dr Clare Barker, formerly Principal Fire Engineer at consultant Exova, was being probed by Richard Millett QC, leading counsel to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, at the resumption of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry following the UK’s coronavirus lockdown.
She was asked if, at the time, she considered cladding the building would present any particular issues or problems with regard to fire safety, Dr Barker replied: “No, I didn’t.”
Dr Barker was also asked if there was a reason why she did not suggest that advice on the specific cladding system should be included in the fire safety strategy, to which she also replied: “No.”
Millett QC then asked Dr Barker if the question of the need for cavity barriers within the cladding should form part of the fire strategy discussed, to which she replied: “Not at that meeting.”
Construction Manager reports that, moving on to Exova’s fee proposal, Millett quoted to Dr Barker the scope of the consultant’s works. The proposal said: “This scope of works is based on the assumption that a detailed appraisal is not required of the structural fire protection to the loadbearing elements of structure or of the fire compartmentation within the building. However, if it should transpire during the site survey that such an appraisal is necessary, then the scope of works can be extended to cover this, subject to a separate fee agreement.”
He asked on what basis the assumption was made that an appraisal of the structural fire protection of the compartmentation was not necessary.
Dr Barker replied: “I would say it was assumed that, because the building was a concrete building, it possessed the necessary fire resistance, as well as because at the time that it was constructed it was required to be a building with two-hour fire resistance to the structural elements. As it says underneath about carrying out a site survey to do that appraisal, that wouldn’t be something that we could do.”
£1 billion Building Safety Fund launched by government
During the first budget of 2020 in March, the newly-appointed Chanceller of the Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, announced that extra funds will be made available from the Government to support the removal of combustible Grenfell-style cladding on tower blocks. On June 4, the Government announced the launch of the Building Safety Fund, by opening the registration process, which closes on 31 July 2020.
The Building Safety Fund is designed to help building owners and landlords replace unsafe non-ACM cladding on residential buildings at least 18 metres high which do not comply with building regulations. Unsafe non-ACM cladding includes certain types of other (non-Aluminium) metal composite or high pressure laminate panels, render and timber wall systems.
Experts had already commented that the original £600m would not be enough, even for those blocks with cladding that conforms to the Government’s strict rules. The Chancellor noted this in his budget speech, and has pledged an extra £1 billion in a new building safety fund.
During the announcement, The Chancellor said: “Two and a half years on, we’re still grappling with the tragic legacy of Grenfell. Expert advice is clear that new public funding must concentrate on removing unsafe materials from high rise residential buildings, so today I am creating a new building safety fund worth £1 billion.”
He followed on to say that all experts, committees (including the select committee) and the opposition agree that this is necessary. The funding will go “beyond ACM to make sure that all unsafe cladding will be removed for all social and residential buildings above 18m high”.
The Housing Secretary pledged to look to spearhead these efforts in the housing sector.
The Government also pledged increased investment to national infrastructure projects across the UK, including in 4G and broadband coverage, green transportation methods.
MPs launch inquiry into cladding remediation
In March 2020, it was announced that MPs were to launch a new inquiry to review the progress made in removing potentially dangerous cladding from high-rise and high-risk buildings. The Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee inquiry announced that it would also look at the adequacy of funding by the government.
The government has offered funding for the removal of aluminium composite material (ACM) ACM cladding from private sector properties but the Committee pointed out that 143 out of 175 properties with this form of cladding are yet to begin remedial work. Residents in properties with other forms of cladding face uncertainty of the timescale for removal and potential costs of tens of thousands of pounds, it added.
The inquiry will examine the scale of issues facing residents in buildings due to combustible cladding. It will also look at the quality and effectiveness of government support for the removal of all form of dangerous cladding from existing buildings, in particular the pace of remediation.
The Committee’s chair, Labour MP Clive Betts, said: “There are still hundreds of buildings encased in combustible cladding and thousands of residents facing serious financial strain as a result. The knock-on effect of dangerous cladding on buildings has been significant, with homeowners facing increased insurance or mortgage premiums, and even having to fund round-the-clock fire patrols simply to stay in their own homes.
“The government is providing financial support to enable the removal of ACM cladding from privately owned buildings, but this appears to be far short of what is necessary to address the real scale of the issue.
“We have launched this inquiry to understand the impact that the government’s response has had in providing support and driving forward remediation work. We also want to better understand the scale of the problems facing residents and look at what more will need to be done to ensure that buildings are made safe, and the financial impact on residents addressed.
“This Committee has already called on the government to fund the removal of all forms of combustible cladding and criticised the pace of change. Nearly 1,000 days since the fire at Grenfell Tower, these issues must now be addressed.”
Fire Safety Bill introduced by the Home Office
The Home Office has introduced a new Fire Safety Bill, in an effort to improve fire safety in buildings in England and Wales.
Set to amend the Fire Safety Order 2005, the bill has been designed to “ensure that people feel safe in their homes, and a tragedy like the Grenfell Tower fire never happens again”.
The Home Office has set out clarification to who is accountable for reducing the risk of fires – the duty-holder/building owner for multi-occupied, residential buildings. They must manage the risk of fire for:
The structure and external walls of the building (e.g. cladding, balconies and windows);
Entrance doors to individual flats that open into communal areas.
On 11 March 2020, the second phase of the Grenfell Tower inquiry were presented with an email, sent in 2013 from Mark Harris, of Harley Facades, advising architects that, “from a selfish point of view”, his firm’s preference was to use aluminium composite material (ACM).
ACM was “tried and tested” and the firm had used it many times before, he said.
The second phase of the inquiry is looking into how the building came to be covered in such cladding.
It is the first time that the inquiry has listened to suggestions as to why the material used to clad the building was changed during the refurbishment programme, between 2012 and 2016.
Fire safety guidance for tall buildings were not checked by architect
A week previously, Studio E’s Bruce Sounes, told the inquiry that he wasn’t aware of concerns over the safety of combustible panels often being used on housing blocks.
He said fire safety details were for specialist consultants and added that he had not designed the cladding used.
‘Requires improvement’ at effectively keeping people safe and secure from fire and other risks;
’Requires improvement’ at how efficiently it manages its resources; and
’Requires improvement’ at looking after its people.
The report said that firefighters regularly missed training and attended too many false alarms.
HM Inspector of Fire and Rescue Services Matt Parr called the findings ‘disappointing’ and said there are ‘too many’ areas where LFB needs to improve: “Criticism should be balanced, however, by the things the Brigade does well: it is good at understanding the risk of fire and other emergencies and preventing fires and other risks. It also responds well with other emergency services to national risks. But it should improve the way it protects the public both through fire regulation, and how it responds to fires and other emergencies.
“It is well-resourced and exceeds its own standards on response times. But its operational policies don’t reflect national operational guidance, even for risk-critical areas such as incident command. And its incident commanders and emergency drivers are not as well trained by the Brigade as they should be. This is something that needs to be urgently addressed.
“We have concluded there is a long way to go before London Fire Brigade is as efficient as it could be.”
Government response to Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 1 report
In January 2020, the Government published a document in response the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 1 report, which was published on 30 October 2019.
The response sets out the actions taken by the Government, in addressing the recommendations made to it and to the Emergency Services, including the London Fire Brigade. In 2019, The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report, heavily criticised the response of The London Fire Brigade (LFB) citing ‘serious shortcomings’ and ‘systemic failures’.
Recommendations where changes are required by law;
‘Stay put’ and evacuation;
Testing and certification;
Evacuation alert systems and internal signage;
Building Safety Regulator.
The introduction to the paper confirms that the Government will ‘continue to ensure that we actively engage with those who have been personally affected by the tragedy and listen to their views on the changes made to building regulations and fire safety.’
It goes on to acknowledge noted that LFB has accepted in full the recommendations directed to it, as well as those for the Fire and Rescue Services more broadly. ‘The Home Office welcomes the steps LFB inform us they have already taken to address the Inquiry’s recommendations. These include revisions to policy guidance and advice to ensure personnel are better informed of the risks of fire taking hold in external walls, and the roll out of Fire Survival Guidance refresher training. The Home Office also supports LFB making smoke hoods available as part of breathing apparatus sets on all their fire appliances,’ it says.
Phase 2 of the Inquiry will investigate the wider context – including the nature and application of building regulations, the way in which local and central government responded to the fire, and the handling of concerns raised by tenants over many years.
On 20 January 2020, Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick, said that the government would begin naming the owners of high-rise buildings who’ve been slow to remove dangerous cladding. Figures show that work has yet to start on 157 residential buildings with the same type of cladding identified as a factor in the Grenfell Tower fire. Mr Jenrick told MPs: “Unless swift progress is seen in the coming weeks, I will publicly name building owners where action to remediate unsafe ACM cladding has not started. There can be no more excuses for delay, I’m demanding immediate action.”
Grenfell Tower fire
72 people were killed by the fire that engulfed the Grenfell Tower block in North Kensington, West London on Wednesday, 14 June 2017.
The 24-storey tower block burned throughout the day, taking firefighters over 24 hours to get it under control, leading to confusion and uncertainty that lasted for days.
In the 1,000-page document, which will be officially published today, enquiry Chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick states that fewer people would have died, if the LFB had taken certain actions earlier.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that the report “gives the victims the truth,” and that the world “is finally hearing the truth about what happened.”
Issues highlighted in the report include:
A lack of training in how to ‘recognise the need for an evacuation or how to organise one’;
Incident commanders ‘of relatively junior rank” being unable to change strategy;
Control room officers lacking training on when to advise callers to evacuate;
An assumption that crews would reach callers, resulting in ‘assurances which were not well founded’;
Communication between the control room and those on the ground being ‘improvised, uncertain and prone to error’;
A lack of an organised way to share information within the control room, meaning officers had ‘no overall picture of the speed or pattern of fire spread’;
Sir Martin Moore-Bick issued the following statement, on publishing the report.
In response, the LFB said it would “carefully and fully consider all of Sir Martin Moore-Bick’s Phase 1 report and take every action we can to improve public safety,” but that it was “disappointed” by some of the criticism of individuals. It also added disappointment that “measures we have been calling for are not in the recommendations, including the wider use of sprinklers in both new and existing buildings”.
On the night of the fire, the London Fire Brigade received an unprecedented number of 999 calls, but the report calls their operation beset by “shortcomings in practice, policy and training”. It said that call handlers were not always obtaining necessary information from the calls to ascertain where in the building the call originated from. It also says that some handlers were not made aware of what to tell residents in terms of when to evacuate.
Sir Martin says that operators were “not aware of the danger of assuming that crews would always reach callers”, stating a lack of lessons learnt from the 2009 fire at Lakanal House.
On 16 September 2019, it was revealed that, as part of the investigation into the fire, The LFB had been interviewed under caution by police. The interviews were conducted voluntarily, “as a body, rather than an individual” in relation to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the fire service said.
London Fire Commissioner Dany Cotton said that the fire service recognised the need for answers by survivors and the bereaved. She said that hundreds of LFB staff and volunteers had already provided interview voluntarily and that they would continue to assist the investigation.
“We must all understand what happened and why to prevent communities and emergency services from ever being placed in such impossible conditions ever again,” she added.
Ms Cotton herself was not exempt from criticism, regarding her evidence to the public inquiry in September 2018. She told the hearing that she wouldn’t change a thing about the LFB’s response to the fire. The report said she showed “remarkable insensitivity” and a lack of willing to learn lessons from Grenfell.
Andy Roe to replace Dany Cotton as head of London Fire Brigade
In December 2019 Ms Cotton stepped down from the role, four months ahead of her planned retirement date. Following the public inquiry into Grenfell, she faced several calls to resign, with Grenfell United saying that a change at the top would ‘keep Londoners safe’.
Ms Cotton, who said said Grenfell Tower was “without doubt the worst fire” the London Fire Brigade has ever faced, has worked on “some of the most painful incidents to have occurred in LFB’s history” during her 32 years with the service, including the Clapham Junction rail crash in 1988 and the fire which gutted the iconic Cutty Sark in 2007.
On 12 December 2019, The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, appointed Andy Roe as London’s new Fire Commissioner. The appointment follows ‘a comprehensive international recruitment process’, according to a statement from the Mayor’s office. Mr Khan praised Ms Cotton’s career, but said her decision to leave was ‘the right one’.
A Former British Army officer, Andy brings a wealth of experience dealing with major incidents and having operational command from his time the army, as well as during his career with the LFB, where he has worked since 2002, progressing through the ranks as a firefighter – initially at Clerkenwell and West Hampstead.
Sadiq Khan, said: “Keeping Londoners safe is my number-one priority and I’m determined to do everything I can to ensure we have a fire and rescue service that is the best in the world. Andy Roe is a hugely experienced firefighter and I’m really pleased to have appointed him as London’s Fire Commissioner.”
Andy Roe, said: “It is an enormous privilege to be offered this opportunity to lead London Fire Brigade into a new decade.
“We have some real challenges ahead, but I’ll be working tirelessly with the Brigade, the Mayor and London’s communities to ensure we deliver on the recommendations of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry report. I’m looking forward to leading the Brigade through a period of transformation and delivering a workforce that truly reflects the diverse city we serve.”
British Safety Council response to the fire
Commenting on the findings of Phase 1 of the inquiry, Mike Robinson, Chief Executive of the British Safety Council, said: “This is a lengthy and detailed report and the industry will rightly take time to digest its details. However, it is clear there were serious shortcomings in the procedures for evacuating Grenfell Tower and in the readiness of the fire brigade, notwithstanding the individual heroism of the firefighters on the night.”
He went on to say: “As we look ahead to Phase 2 of the inquiry, lessons must be learnt about the choice of materials used to clad Grenfell Tower and the regulatory regime for high-rise buildings. As we said at the time of the fire, we urge all politicians to re-emphasise the need for effective health and safety regulation and competent fire risk management. These are fundamental to saving lives and sustaining our communities.
“Our thoughts must be with the families of the victims and the survivors of that tragedy. This detailed and important inquiry could not have taken place without their willingness to relive the horror of 14 June 2017. We can honour the victims’ memory by making sure that this tragedy can never happen again.”
The British Safety Council welcomes recommendations of the report relating to proactive fire door inspections, enhanced firefighting lift inspections and a significant increase in the provision of information to the fire enforcing authority.
James Lewis, Head of Audit and Consultancy at the British Safety Council, said: “In course of our extensive work with owners and managers of property, we have seen countless examples of failure to maintain fire safety standards at the required levels. All too often, we see fire doors left un-managed and damaged, a resistance from building owners and operators to communicate and cooperate with the fire enforcing authority, as well as failures to provide suitable and sufficient information to buildings’ occupiers.”
The British Safety Council welcomes the following recommendations from the executive summary of the report and calls for the government to consider their implementation:
Section 6, A and B – Legal requirement for the provision of up-to-date plans to the local fire and rescue service and provision of premises information boxes,
Section 7, A and B – Legal requirement for enhanced checks of firefighting lifts and provision of information to the local fire and rescue service,
Section 12, D – Provision (for all existing and future buildings) for the local fire and rescue service to send an evacuation signal to all residents of high-rise buildings,
Section 15, 33:28 – Legal requirement for owners and operators of every residential building to provide information and instruction to residents in a format that can be reasonably understood by all,
Section 16, A and B – Urgent inspection of all fire doors of every residential building which contains separate dwellings, as well as a legal requirement to inspect fire doors on a quarterly basis.
In the days that followed the tragedy, Prime Minister at time, Theresa May ordered a public inquiry into the devastating blaze. “Right now, people want answers. That’s why I am today ordering a full public inquiry into this disaster,” said the PM whilst visiting the scene. “We need to know what happened, we need to have an explanation of this. People deserve answers; the inquiry will give them.”
A criminal investigation was also opened to examine whether building regulations had been breached when the block was refurbished, while then-Communities Secretary Sajid Javid set up an Independent Expert Advisory Panel (IEAP) to report on what measures could be implemented to make buildings safer.
Mayor of London Sadiq Khan commented shortly after that the fire was a “preventable accident” caused by “years of neglect” by the local council and successive governments and demanded a “national response” to the tragedy.
In the phase one inquiry report, it said that the external walls of the tower failed to comply with building regulations. This area of the tower was the focal point of the refurbishment work in 2016.
Sir Martin Moore-Bick said that there was ‘compelling evidence’ that the walls did not “adequately resist the spread of fire”.
“On the contrary,” he added, “they actively promoted it.”
Reports at the time suggested that residents of Grenfell had raised concerns about fire safety in the flats going back many years but they were ‘disregarded’. Rydon Construction, which carried out the refurbishment work, is reported to have said that it “met all required building control, fire regulation and health and safety standards.”
Following refurbishment work, completed in 2016, London Fire Brigade gave the tower block a ‘medium’ fire risk rating but the resident’s group continued to make claims about fire safety worries.
Since the tragedy, investigations into the cause and response to the fire have been ongoing.
The ongoing public inquiry, launched by its Chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick in August 2017, received hundreds of thousands of documents and hundreds of applications to be core participants. Oral evidence and findings from expert reports began to be heard in June 2018.
Hackitt concluded that indifference and ignorance had led to a “race to the bottom” in building safety practices and expressed the need for a “radical rethink of the whole system and how it works”. This included recommendations for recommends a “very clear model of risk ownership” and an “outcomes-based” regulatory framework, but did not recommend an explicit ban on combustible cladding.
Following the report’s publication, the government said it would consult on banning combustible cladding. Housing Secretary James Brokenshire added that ministers will also look to ban the use of desktop studies to assess the performance of external cladding systems based on the BS 8414 test.
The cladding used on housing is one of the primary focuses of scrutiny following the Grenfell fire. An estimated 800 high rise buildings across the country use similar cladding to that found in Grenfell Tower. A number of tests into cladding have resulted worrying results: Javid said in September that of 173 high-rise social housing blocks fitted with aluminium cladding, only 8 passed fire safety building regulations.
It was revealed in March that only seven of the 158 social housing blocks in England with dangerous cladding have had the material completely removed. The government announced in May that it will fund a £400-million operation to remove dangerous cladding from tower blocks owned by councils and housing associations.
Also under scrutiny was the standard advice to tenants of blocks of flats that they are safer if they stay in their accommodation than to leave, unless it is their flat which is on fire.
Lessons from Grenfell: Why aren’t we learning?
In episode 8 of the Safety & Health Podcast, we hear from Gill Kernick about the pressing need to improve building safety culture post-Grenfell. We then look ahead to 2021 with some news from the Women in Safety & Health Network, plus hear an update on the One Percent Safer Foundation.
London Fire Brigade must do more to fully address failings from Grenfell, says report
A report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) has found that the London Fire Brigade still has more work to do to fully address its failings from the Grenfell Tower fire.
Housing Secretary pledges additional £3.5bn to tackle cladding crisis
Fund is in addition to the £1.6bn released for the Building Safety Fund, announced last year, and will be used to help remove unsafe cladding from high-rise buildings, but critics say the proposals fall short of what is needed.
‘Unacceptable’ that some building owners have yet to start remediation work on unsafe ACM buildings, says Building Safety Minister
In a statement released in January, Building Safety Minister Lord Stephen Greenhalgh noted that it was “unacceptable a minority” of buildings identified by the Government as having unsafe ACM cladding have yet to start remediation works.
Government’s £30m Waking Watch Fund for fire alarm installations is open for applications
Designed to ‘remove’ or ‘reduce’ the need for interim safety measures at high-rise buildings with unsafe cladding, the UK Housing Secretary, Robert Jenrick, announced the £30 million Waking Watch Relief Fund is open for applications.
National construction products regulator established to ‘build homes safer’ following Grenfell revelations
The establishment of a new national construction products regulator was announced by UK Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick on 19 January, in response to the revelations from the Grenfell Inquiry that manufacturers were knowingly ignoring safety rules.
Delay in implementing Grenfell recommendations ‘abysmal’, says FPA
Jonathan O’Neill, Managing Director of the Fire Protection Association (FPA), has commented on the Lord’s amendment which requires Grenfell Inquiry recommendations to be implemented on the Fire Safety Bill.
Setting the Bar for competence in the building safety sector
Setting the Bar is the second and final report of the Competence Steering Group and is an update on the interim report, Raising the Bar, published in August 2019. The Joint Industry Board (JIB), explains more about the proposals relating to the competence of persons carrying out construction work going forward.
‘Culture change towards competency still needed in construction’, highlights Dame Hackitt
After the ISSG (Industry Safety Steering Group) released its latest report ‘scrutinising progress towards change Post-Grenfell’, Dame Judith Hackitt has reiterated the need for improved culture change and competency in the construction sector.
UK Government continues to review fire safety as it opens consultation into Regulatory Reform Order
In partnership with the Draft Building Safety Bill that was published earlier this week, the UK Government is doubling its efforts to review fire safety by launching an open consultation into the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
Draft Building Safety Bill announced by UK government
Alongside the Fire Safety Bill and fire safety consultation, the Building Safety Bill is said to be bringing the “biggest improvements to building safety in nearly 40 years”. The Draft Bill was announced on 20 July by Robert Jenrick MP, Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government.
Post-Grenfell regulation aims to transform fire safety in buildings
Nearly three years after the devastating Grenfell Tower fire, the Government has published its proposals for what it calls “the biggest change in building safety for a generation”. IFSEC Global reporter, Ron Alalouff, highlights the main features of the wide-ranging provisions.
High-risk buildings: Calls for new safety standards to be incrementally extended
The Government’s plans, confirmed earlier this month by Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick, include compulsory installation of sprinkler systems and clearer emergency signing for residential buildings above 11 metres.
Budget 2020: Statutory sick pay will be paid to all those who choose to self-isolate
In the first budget of 2020, the newly-appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, has pledged the NHS will get ‘whatever resources it needs’ during the coronavirus crisis, while he has also unveiled measures to boost the self-employed and small businesses who are left out of pocket.
Grenfell Tower fire: Government pledges additional £3.5bn to tackle cladding crisis72 people were killed by the horrific fire that engulfed the Grenfell Tower block of flats in North Kensington, West London on Wednesday, 14 June 2017.
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