Step in the right direction – Piper Alpha

 

Looking at the industry today, there is evidence that HSE culture is becoming increasingly more important as a way of measuring good performance. HSE culture maturity differs between organisations. Problems can arise where two organisations collaborate on joint activities but operate at different maturity levels and this can manifest itself at supervisor-worker level.

 

Key points that need to be considered are:

 

Human contribution

High severity, low-frequency events can stem from a small mistake and this may have been the case on Piper Alpha all those years ago. What we do know is that human contribution has figured prominently in a number of tragedies that have led to significant loss of life, including the disaster at Chernobyl, the Herald of Free Enterprise and the King’s Cross underground fire.

 

The North Sea is a challenging work environment. Maintaining oil and gas wells to maximise production brings real danger to those who perform this work. For example, some wells are installed at an angle to make entry into the reservoir easier, which presents unique challenges to the well intervention crews. Equipment handling and set up, pressure envelopes, lifting operations and the use of explosives all represent significant hazards. 

 

Additional risks can come from other activities that take place simultaneously. Good work planning is therefore essential and should recognise that the person on the front line is usually the only one working in real time. This will have a direct bearing on whether the work can be carried out successfully. 

 

In my experience, onshore teams do not always consider this. Poor decision making during the planning and execution phase can be the precursor for mistakes and in some cases this is coupled with deliberate violations of rules and procedures.

 

As part of a master’s research project undertaken at Robert Gordon University in 2012, a group of offshore technicians and supervisors were interviewed and asked to share some of their experiences. When asked about deviating from procedures an offshore supervisor told me: “Personally speaking there is no deviation whatsoever. They are what keep us safe and if the guys don’t want to follow that, they won’t be part of the team, it’s as simple as that.” 

 

There are other views on this and another supervisor commented that he felt there was some deviation allowed. 

 

Rule breaking is another subject that was discussed. One technician interviewed admitted to not always following company procedures and on one occasion he had bypassed safety barriers while working on a live well. It is difficult to determine whether this type of behaviour is commonplace.

 

The industry recognises the need for a more collaborative approach when it comes to supervising the workforce. Engagement on key issues such as behaviours and workplace-hazard perception are high on the improvement agenda.

 

Risk management approach

The need to carry out a risk assessment for work activities is a legal requirement under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.  

 

In 2010/11, Health and Safety Executive accident statistics showed that there were in excess of 100 lost time injuries (over three-day absence from work) in that two-year period. The causes associated with many of these incidents suggest that lack of detail in risk assessments and poor supervision were contributory factors.

 

International Standard BS ISO 31000 details risk management principles and guidelines for managing risk and offers a broad approach to managing risk. All too often we still talk about risk in negative terms instead of looking for the opportunities for improvement that a more open approach can offer. One of the biggest failings is in not establishing the context around what we 

are assessing.¹

 

As well as the legal and moral aspects, the need for risk assessing hazardous activities is fundamental to ensuring a safe workplace; any lack of involvement from the workforce in a work planning perspective opens up the potential for mistakes. The assessment shouldn’t be seen as an exercise to confirm everything is ok, rather it is an opportunity for a careful examination of what can go wrong and deciding the controls required before the activity can take place. Supervisors and those carrying out the work can make a considerable contribution to the successful completion of the work and should be part of the wider risk-management effort. 

 

There is now more importance attached to getting offshore crews involved in all phases of the risk assessment. This strengthens their understanding of the layer of protection and barrier controls, and it recognises the importance of their contribution and where they fit in as individuals.

 

Organisation’s support

Getting the organisation’s support is perhaps the most important of the three key points. 

I take organisational support to mean both supervisory support and second-tier management support to those crews carrying out the work.How members of the workforce perceive the level of support they get is also important because there will often be a human contribution when an accident occurs and this needs to be recognised to learn lessons following an accident. 

 

The workforce may have conflicting views when it comes to accident follow up. Asked about the term ‘just culture’ and bias to risk taking, a crew member commented: “There is a lot of disciplinary attitude to it — when mistakes are made the perception is that you are in trouble when you get back to the office. The shutters go up immediately when asked what happened and that limits the lessons to be gained from the investigation.”

 

This suggests that there is still suspicion around the whole meaning of ‘just culture’ and there is still work required to improve it. 

 

There is no doubting the importance of supervisory engagement as an indicator of safety performance; it works best when it involves two layers of management, both the supervisor and the line manager.

 

Academic studies² generally identify two dimensions as being the most influential in determining a safety climate level. The first  is the relevance of safe behaviour at the job site and the second is workforce perceptions around management attitudes to safety.

 

How the workforce view rule breaking and the level of empowerment they have to get things done may be influenced by the messages they get from their supervisor. 

 

Those second tier-managers who have a trusting relationship with their workers are more likely to create a safer working environment. 

 

When the level of communication is good, it is seen as having a positive impact on accident reduction.³ The precursor to this upward safety communication is the support employees feel they are getting from the organisation. If this is seen as good, it opens up possibilities. 

 

Asked about the importance of the level of involvement, a supervisor commented: “If the guys see you out and about, they treat you with more respect and the job runs a lot smoother safety wise.” 

 

Another crewman said he felt vulnerable due to the lack of time his supervisor spent at the worksite: “He spends 90 per cent of his time in the office leaving the junior crew to run the job. That’s a bad situation to be in as you are missing 20 years’ experience when it’s needed.”

 

Positive culture reflecting shared beliefs, values, behaviours and attitudes is something not always shared across the whole organisation. The workers’ perception of a safety culture and the impact this has on accident risk control can vary greatly. 

 

A study into different offshore work groups⁴ found that some felt isolated due to the nature of their work and, as a result, did not actively involve themselves in the ‘safety culture’ of the installation.

 

At times the leadership style and approach of some offshore installation managers (OIMs) makes it difficult for temporary crews to integrate into platform ways of working. As an example, well services work is seen as a specialist activity — and rightly so. 

 

However, platform OIMs have a duty of care under the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SCR05) for the overall co-ordination of activities and safety of all workers on the platform. This responsibility cannot be transferred to others and remains one of the biggest concerns facing transient workers such as well intervention crews.

 

In order to improve safety culture there is a need to understand the organisation and identify where real improvements can be made. One tool available is the culture maturity ladder [Figure 1]. This determines where an organisation sits on a scale of improving HSE culture and should be discussed between management and workforce before deciding what needs to be improved. 

 

Analysing the root causes of accidents and near misses will provide insight into the HSE culture that exists in an organisation. For example, accident causation findings may indicate that you have a problem with people not following procedures, so a review of the quality of supervision may be one area to concentrate on.

 

If there is still a reluctance for people to act on their instinct to challenge, we need to look at how this can be improved. The difference in perceptions held by both workers and supervisors can have a major impact in achieving a safe workplace. Barriers such as poor leadership, poor safety culture and a lack of workforce participation can be seen as contributory factors to delivering below-standard performance. Applying tools such as the culture ladder will, over time, encourage leaders to create an environment that changes behaviours in a positive way, allowing the organisation to maintain a strong focus on leadership, supervision and personal responsibility.

 

While this gap exists there will continue to be incompatible goals and distrust around safety and this becomes a critical success factor particularly when several companies converge to deliver services such as drilling and well intervention.

 

References

Stuart McIlroy is a chartered health, safety and environment manager

 

This article is based on a presentation Stuart gave at a conference in Aberdeen in June 2013 to mark the 25th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster.