Drowning of 60-year-old construction worker was avoidable but essential learning must be taken from the tragedy, explains legal expert.
Knostrop weir in Leeds, West Yorkshire. CREDIT: Paul Heaton / Alamy Stock Photo
On 30 October 2017, Gary Webster drowned in the River Aire, Leeds, West Yorkshire, when the boat he was working from capsized.
Mr Webster and another worker were removing debris from the gates of Knostrop Weir when a substantial flow of water from the weir overwhelmed the boat. The 60-year-old was pulled under water and recovered by a diver 14 minutes later. He died two days later at Leeds General Infirmary. His colleague was able to swim to safety.
In June this year, Webster’s employees, the construction firm BAM Nuttall Ltd were fined £2.34m after pleading guilty to breaching section 2(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
The court heard that the construction firm failed to utilise trained and authorised operatives who could have controlled the flow of the water.
In her comments from the case, HSE Inspector Jane Towey said the drowning would never have happened if the construction company had carried out safe working practices. “BAM Nuttall Ltd failed to plan the work. It failed to carry out any assessment of the risks involved with the task. It failed to have any regard to the recognised hierarchy of controls to reduce the risk associated with removing debris from the water.”
Tom McNeill at BCL Solicitors says while the drowning was easily avoidable there are perhaps far more important lessons to be learnt. “With hindsight, the failings were basic and stark and, as the HSE noted, could so easily have been avoided. If any lesson is going to be learned, however, the starting point must be that these failings happened in a company that took its safety responsibilities seriously and devoted considerable resource to safety management.
“At the earlier coroner’s inquest, the company explained the careful planning that had gone into all other tasks executed on site that day – the risk assessments, procedures, and competency requirements. A dynamic risk assessment was carried out prior to the task commencing – while inadequate, the relevant employees knew that Step One was to consider safety, they just didn’t understand the risks: the hazards presented by weirs are variable and not obvious.
“The ‘solution’ was for the risks to be addressed at the ‘safety management’ level, rather than leaving it to workers on the ground. This is what happened after the accident. Consolidated guidance was produced banning the activity and trained out to relevant workers. This ‘solution’, however, requires the management to have spotted the risk in the first instance, or have the risk reported to them. The management, as well as workers on the ground, are as prone to knowledge gaps, lack of foresight, oversights, and errors of judgment as everyone else. They must also deal with the hundreds of other life-threatening risks that are present on a largescale construction project.
The lesson therefore is not that incidents of this kind are ‘easily avoided’ by simply carrying out correct control measures, but recognising just how difficult it is in changing, high-risk environments to identify all material risks and ensure effective controls. This understanding is essential for developing the most effective systems practicable, as well as responding to investigations and prosecutions.”
The Safety Conversation with SHP (previously the Safety and Health Podcast) aims to bring you the latest news, insights and legislation updates in the form of interviews, discussions and panel debates from leading figures within the profession.
Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and Google Podcasts, subscribe and join the conversation today!
