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Ron Alalouff is a journalist specialising in the fire and security markets, and a former editor of websites and magazines in the same fields.
October 8, 2024

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Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Widespread strengthening of construction industry regulation at heart of recommendations

The Phase 2 report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry concludes with a set of recommendations from the inquiry panel mainly covering the construction industry.

Credit: Tommy London/Alamy Stock Photo

The system of regulating the construction and refurbishment of high-rise residential buildings that existed at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire was “seriously defective” in several areas, says the report. The regulation of the construction industry was “too complex and fragmented” providing a “recipe for inefficiency” and an “obstacle to effective regulation”. The report therefore recommends a wide scope of regulatory functions – including responsibility for Building Regulations and official guidance, building control, construction product standards, testing and certification, and the accreditation of fire risk assessors – should be overseen by a single regulator. It also concludes that the definition of a higher-risk building by reference only to its height is unsatisfactory, and that the definition for the purposes of the Building Safety Act should be urgently reviewed.

The report also notes the number of government departments currently responsible for fire safety. It recommends responsibility for the fire safety functions currently exercised by MHCLG, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade, is brought into one department under a single Secretary of State. The Secretary of State should have the services of a Chief Construction Adviser, with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry.

Other recommendations include:

  • Statutory guidance in general and Approved Document B in particular should be reviewed and a revised version published as soon as possible. It should contain clear warnings that following the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with Building Regulations.
  • Reconsideration of the assumption in Approved Document B that a ‘stay put’ policy for fires in high-rise residential buildings is appropriate, because new materials and methods of construction – together with the practice of overcladding existing buildings – make effective compartmentation “a questionable assumption.”
  • The guidance should draw attention to the need for a qualified fire engineer to calculate the likely rate of fire spread and the time required for evacuation – including the evacuation of those with physical or mental impairments – which “ought to form an essential part of any fire safety strategy.”
  • A statutory requirement that a fire strategy is produced by a registered fire engineer and submitted with building control applications for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building, and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at completion stage. Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people – including the additional time they may need to leave the building or reach a place of safety within it – and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety.

The report also makes recommendations about new test methods for external wall systems, the importance of external wall systems assessments being carried out by suitably qualified fire engineers, and that the construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products.

In addition, the report recommends:

  • The profession of fire engineer should be recognised and protected by law, with an independent body established to regulate the profession, define standards, maintain a register of members and regulate their conduct
  • The development of fire engineering courses for construction professionals and members of the fire and rescue services as part of their continuing professional development
  • The Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects should review changes made since the Grenfell Tower fire to improve the education and training of architects, to ensure they are sufficient in the light of the inquiry’s findings
  • A licensing scheme is operated by the construction regulator for principal contractors undertaking the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings
  • An independent panel considers whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by approved inspectors, who have a commercial interest in the process, and whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.

Public record of select committee, coroner and public inquiry recommendations

In view of the government’s lack of an adequate response to the recommendations made by the Lakanal House coroner – as well as its disregard of recommendations made by a select committee in 1999 – the report recommends that it should be a legal requirement for government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries, together with a description of the steps taken in response. Also recommended is the establishment of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors.

The report also makes various recommendations on the establishment of a College of Fire and Rescue, assessment of the London Fire Brigade’s progress in improving its control room functions, its training of incident commanders, and its arrangements for identifying high-risk residential buildings and collecting, storing and distributing information about them. The report also recommends the brigade establishes effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, inquests and investigations.

In terms of the response to and recovery from disasters like the Grenfell Tower fire, the report makes a number of recommendations relating to: Category 1 responders under civil contingencies legislation; the revision and consolidation of guidance on preparing for emergencies with greater emphasis for those leading the response to consider the requirements for recovery, the need to identify vulnerable people, the importance of identifying and ensuring co-operation with voluntary, community and faith groups, and consistency with the Equality Act 2010; and local resilience forums adopting national standards to ensure effective training, preparation and planning for emergencies.

In the light of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s ineffective response to the emergency, the report recommends that local authorities train all their employees, including chief executives, to regard resilience as an integral part of their responsibilities. They should also devise methods of obtaining and recording information on displaced and missing people, and practise putting them into operation under a variety of different circumstances. It also recommends that local authorities make plans to place large numbers of people in temporary accommodation at short notice, in ways that meet their personal, religious and cultural requirements.

Mandatory personal emergency evacuation plans

Finally, in view of further evidence given in Phase 2 which demonstrates the importance of being able to provide the fire and rescue service with reliable information about the vulnerability of those needing to be rescued, the report re-iterates its recommendation from Phase 1. This relates to the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building needing to be legally required to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for all residents whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance may be compromised, and including current information about them in a premises information box accessible by firefighters.

READ THE COMPLETE GRENFELL INQUIRY PHASE 2 ANALYSIS

Click here to read Ron Alalouff’s first piece of analysis into the inquiry.

Click here to read Ron’s second piece of analysis on the role of the local authority in the tragedy.

Click here to read Ron’s third piece of analysis on the role of central government in the tragedy.

Click here to read Ron’s fourth piece of analysis on the role of the manufacturers in the tragedy.

Click here to read Ron’s fifth piece of analysis on how the refurbishment of Grenfell contributed to the tragedy.

Click here to read Ron’s sixth piece of analysis looking at the response by the London Fire Brigade to the fire.

Click here to read a legal take on the Report by Annie Davies at Addleshaw Goddard.

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