The highly flammable cladding used on Grenfell Tower was a result of dishonesty on the part of the manufacturers involved, combined with a lax approach to testing and certification, writes Ron Alalouff.
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Those involved in the manufacture and selling of rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products used in the 2014-2016 refurbishment of Grenfell Tower were guilty of “systematic dishonesty,” concludes the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report. It says they engaged in “deliberate and sustained” strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market. The fact that those strategies succeeded was partly because the certification bodies – the British Board of Agrément (BBA) and Local Authority Building Control (LABC) – failed to ensure that the statements in their product certificates were accurate and based on test evidence.
Arconic Architectural Products manufactured and sold the Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen panels used in the external wall of Grenfell Tower. The material was manufactured and sold in flat sheets designed to be cut to size and attached to a metal sub-frame, either as flat panels by rivets or as three-dimensional structures, known as cassettes. Polyethylene burns severely and when used in cassette form Reynobond 55 PE was “extremely dangerous”, according to the report. The inquiry found that “from 2005 until after the Grenfell Tower fire, Arconic deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger of using Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form, particularly on high-rise buildings”.
The inquiry found that by late 2007, Arconic had become aware of the construction industry’s “serious concern” about the safety of ACM panels, and that by the summer of 2011, it was well aware that Reynobond 55 PE in cassette performed much worse in a fire than in its riveted from. And despite the knowledge of cladding fires in Dubai in 2012 and 2013, the company did not withdraw the product in favour of the fire-resistant version then available. Instead, it allowed customers in the UK to continue buying the unmodified product.
Following testing in 2013, says the report, Arconic decided that Reynobond 55 PE would be certified as Class E only, whether used in riveted or cassette form. But it did not pass that information to its customers in the UK or to the BBA, reflecting a “deliberate strategy” to continue selling the product in the UK based on a statement “it knew to be false”.
The inquiry found that with the complicity of the Building Research Establishment (BRE), Celotex tested its RS5000 combustible polyisocyanurate foam insulation with the addition of two sets of fire-resistant magnesium oxide boards placed in critical positions, to ensure that it passed. It then obtained from BRE a test report that failed to mention the magnesium oxide boards, thereby rendering it “materially incomplete and misleading”. The company then marketed the product as “the first PIR board to successfully test to BS 8414” and as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”. From 2011, RS5000 had been sold as having Class 0 fire performance “throughout”, a claim which, according to the report, was false and misleading. Celotex presented it to Harley as suitable and safe for use on Grenfell Tower, although it knew that was not the case.
Kingspan knowingly created a “false market” in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres in height, by claiming that its K15 product has been part of a system successfully tested under BS 8414, and so could be used in the external wall of any building over 18 metres in height – regardless of its design or other components. “That was a false claim, as it well knew,” says the report, because BS 8414 is a method for testing complete wall systems and its results apply only to the particular system tested.
In marketing K15, Kingspan relied on the results of a single BS 8414-1 test in 2005 on a system whose components were not representative of a typical external wall, the report continues. The company continued to rely on that test without disclosing that it had changed the composition of the product in 2006. Tests performed in 2007 and 2008 on systems incorporating the then current form of K15 were “disastrous”, but Kingspan did not withdraw the product. Moreover, the company concealed from BBA the fact that the product it was selling differed from the product that had been incorporated into the system tested in 2005.
In 2009, says the report, Kingspan obtained a certificate from LABC that contained false statements about K15 and supported its use generally on buildings over 18 metres high, and it “relied on that certificate for many years to sell the product. It made a calculated decision to use the LABC certificate to mask, or distract from, the absence of supporting test evidence.” In 2013, Kingspan persuaded the BBA to include a statement that wrongly implied that K15 was a product of limited combustibility.
The British Board of Agrément (BBA) issued certificates of compliance for Kingspan K15 insulation and Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen panels used on Grenfell Tower. As the report states: “The dishonest strategies of Arconic and Kingspan succeeded in a large measure due to the incompetence of the BBA, its failure to adhere robustly to the system of checks it had put in place, and an ingrained willingness to accommodate customers instead of insisting on high standards…”
Local Authority Building Control (LABC) is an association of local authority building control departments which aims to provide support with training and technical matters, and provides centralised marketing for its members. It issued certificates verifying the compliance of construction products and systems with Building Regulations and Approved Documents after an initial assessment by a local authority building control surveyor and a second stage review by a group of experts.
The inquiry found that there was a lack of rigour and accuracy in LABC’s work. “The LABC must take its share of the blame for the acceptance by the market of Celotex RS5000 and Kingspan K15 for use on buildings over 18 metres in height. There was a complete failure on the part of the LABC over a number of years to take basic steps to ensure that the certificates it issued in respect of them were technically accurate.”
The report also levels some criticism at the National House Building Council (NHBC), which employed building control inspectors and exercised considerable influence through its membership of the Building Control Alliance and its publication of guidance. The report says the NHBC “was unwilling to upset its own customers and the wider construction industry by revealing the scale of the use of combustible insulation in the external walls of high-rise buildings, contrary to the statutory guidance. The conflict between the regulatory function of building control and the pressures of commercial interests prevents a system of that kind from effectively serving the public interest.”
The same sort of criticism is levelled at the Building Research Establishment (BRE), which played an “important part” in enabling Celotex and Kingspan to market their products for use in the external walls of buildings over 18 metres high. “BRE’s systems were not robust enough to ensure complete independence and the necessary degree of technical rigour at all times. As a result, it sacrificed rigorous application of principle to its commercial interests.”
Finally, the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), which accredits bodies such as BBA and BRE, did not always follow its own policies and its assessment processes were lacking in rigour and comprehensiveness. “The process relied too much on the candour and co-operation of the organisations being assessed and too much was left to trust. UKAS should have taken a more searching, even sceptical, attitude to the organisations it accredited. Its powers to take action were surprisingly limited, with no powers of enforcement.”
FURTHER READING:
Click here to read Ron Alalouff’s first piece of analysis into the inquiry.
Click here to read Ron’s second piece of analysis on the role of the local authority in the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s third piece of analysis on the role of central government in the tragedy.
Click here to read a legal take on the Report by Annie Davies at Addleshaw Goddard.
