The organisations involved in the doomed refurbishment of Grenfell Tower did not take fire safety seriously, and assumed that fire safety matters they should have considered would be dealt with by someone else, writes Ron Alalouff.
Credit: BRIAN ANTHONY/Alamy Stock Photo
Those are some of the findings of the Phase 2 report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry published earlier this month. The report criticised the project architect Studio E, the principal contractor Rydon, the cladding sub-contractor Harley, and the fire engineering consultant Exova, as well as the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) and The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s building control department.
Rydon’s bid for the principal refurbishment contractor role was judged to be the most competitive, though it still exceeded budget. Although the TMO had received legal advice that it would be improper to do so, it agreed with Rydon before the procurement process had been completed that if Rydon were awarded the contract, it would reduce its price “to an acceptable level”.
Cost again reared its ugly head over the specification of rainscreen panels. Initially, Studio E wanted to use zinc rainscreen panels but eventually the cheaper aluminium composite material (ACM) – Reynobond 55 PE – was specified. Rydon was able to offer a substantial saving by using ACM panels as a result of its relationship with cladding sub-contractor, Harley.
The selection of combustible materials for the cladding of Grenfell Tower resulted from “a series of errors caused by the incompetence” of those involved in the refurbishment. Studio E, Rydon and Harley all took a “casual approach” to contractual relations, says the report. “They did not properly understand the nature and scope of the obligations they had undertaken or, if they did, paid scant attention to them. They failed to identify their own responsibilities for important aspects of the design and in each case, assumed that someone else was responsible for matters affecting fire safety. Everyone involved in the choice of the materials to be used in the external wall thought that responsibility for their suitability and safety lay with someone else.”
None of those involved in the design of the external wall acted in accordance with the standards of a reasonably competent person in their position, and they were not familiar with, or did not understand, the relevant provisions of the Building Regulations, Approved Document B or industry guidance, says the report. “Studio E demonstrated a cavalier attitude to the regulations affecting fire safety and Rydon and Harley relied on their previous experience, rather than on any technical analysis or expertise. The risks of using combustible materials in the external walls of high-rise buildings were well known and they should have been aware of them.”
Fire engineer Exova started drafting a fire safety strategy for Grenfell Tower, but this was never completed. In particular, the strategy did not include an analysis of the external wall or its compliance with requirement B4(1) of the Building Regulations. “Exova’s attitude was wholly inconsistent with the careful approach to matters affecting the safety of life to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer.”
As architect, Studio E was responsible for the design of the external wall and for the choice of the materials used in its construction. Although the TMO, as the client, wanted to reduce the cost by using ACM rainscreen panels, it was the responsibility of the architect to determine whether this would comply with Building Regulations. “Its failure to recognise that ACM was dangerous and to warn its client against its use represented “a failure to act in accordance with the standard of a reasonably competent architect”. It also should have recognised that the Celotex insulation was combustible and not suitable for a building over 18 metres high. “Studio E therefore bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster.”
The report also identifies other ways Studio E neglected to act as a “reasonably competent” architect, as it failed to:
Principal contractor Rydon also bears “considerable responsibility” for the fire, the report says. “It gave inadequate thought to fire safety, to which it displayed a casual attitude throughout the project, and its systems for managing the design work did not ensure that its sub-contractors and consultants properly understood their different responsibilities.” Rydon had an inexperienced team that did not have sufficient knowledge of the Building Regulations or Approved Document B and relied entirely on Harley to draw its attention to any design errors. In addition, it did not investigate Harley’s competence to do the work and was “complacent” about the need for fire engineering advice.
The report says cladding subcontractor Harley also “bears a significant degree of responsibility” for the fire. It did not consider fire safety sufficiently at any stage of the refurbishment and apparently thought others involved in the project – and ultimately building control – would ensure the design was safe. Its staff were unaware of the relevant Building Regulations, Approved Document B or industry guidance, and did not understand the underlying testing regime.
The report concludes that RBCK “bears considerable responsibility” for the dangerous condition of the building on completion, as its building control department failed to perform its statutory function of ensuring that the design of the refurbishment complied with the Building Regulations. The surveyor responsible for the refurbishment was “overworked, inadequately trained and had a very limited understanding of the risks associated with the use of ACM panels”.
Finally, says the report, the TMO “must also take a share of the blame for the disaster”. It failed to take sufficient care in its choice of architect and paid insufficient attention to matters affecting fire safety, including the work of the fire engineer.
FURTHER GRENFELL INQUIRY ANALYSIS
Click here to read Ron Alalouff’s first piece of analysis into the inquiry.
Click here to read Ron’s second piece of analysis on the role of the local authority in the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s third piece of analysis on the role of central government in the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s fourth piece of analysis on the role of the manufacturers in the tragedy.
Click here to read a legal take on the Report by Annie Davies at Addleshaw Goddard.
I have ask were was the appointed CDM Co-ordinator/ Principal Designer on this scheme, I have not seen comments raised with regard to his duties during this period.