Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Inadequate planning, leadership and training at heart of poor response to Grenfell fire aftermath
Central and local government’s response during the week after the Grenfell Tower fire was “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal”, according to the public inquiry’s Phase Two report.

Kensington Town Hall. Credit: Jeffrey Blackler/Alamy Stock Photo
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s (RBKC) systems and leadership were “wholly inadequate” to handle such a serious and large-scale incident involving mass fatalities and mass homelessness. The resilience machinery in London and within central government took too long to activate and was not flexible enough.
The report says that certain aspects of the response showed “a marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity,” and left many of those affected feeling abandoned. RBKC should have done more to cater for those from diverse backgrounds, especially Muslims who were observing Ramadan at the time.
RBKC did not have an effective plan to deal with the displacement of a large number of people and did not make effective use of the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO). It had no contingency arrangements for securing a large amount of emergency accommodation at short notice and had no arrangements for identifying or communicating with displaced residents.
Lack of adequate resilience training
One reason for the lack of effective plans, according to the report, was the inadequate training of RBKC staff, who did not have a sufficient understanding of the importance of resilience or sufficient commitment to it. The council had allowed the capacity of its staff to respond to major emergencies to decline, despite clear warnings to senior management that it did not have enough trained staff to carry out its responsibilities as a Category 1 responder. Consequently, it lacked the people it needed to respond to the fire effectively, both for staffing the borough emergency communication centre and dealing with those who needed help. “None of that was due to any lack of financial resources,” the report says.
RBKC’s chief executive, Nicholas Holgate, was “not capable of taking effective control of the situation,” according to the report. He was not well suited to that kind of crisis and “lacked a strong group of officers” to whom he could delegate responsibility. He was reluctant to take advice from those with greater experience and was “unduly concerned” about the council’s reputation.
RBKC had also failed to integrate the TMO into its emergency planning. It should have realised that the TMO’s knowledge of its buildings and their occupants could play an important part in responding to any disaster affecting its housing stock.
The training of resilience personnel in London was piecemeal and not co-ordinated, was only voluntary, and was not subject to any external assessment or validation. Although the government began monitoring the response to the fire at an early stage, its ability to to provide practical assistance was undermined by a shortage of reliable information, and by the restricted nature of its powers to intervene.
TMO staff “threw themselves” into response
Although the TMO was criticised from many quarters, much of this was unfair in terms of its response to disaster. Although its staff should have received more training in dealing with emergencies, they “threw themselves into the response” to the situation and helped to provide support.
Members of the local community are singled out for praise for their contribution to the disaster, which only served to “emphasise the inadequacies of the official response”. With the support of local voluntary organisations, “they provided support in the hours immediately following the fire when the authorities were conspicuous by their absence”.
FURTHER GRENFELL INQUIRY ANALYSIS
Click here to read Ron Alalouff’s first piece of analysis into the inquiry.
Click here to read Ron’s second piece of analysis on the role of the local authority in the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s third piece of analysis on the role of central government in the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s fourth piece of analysis on the role of the manufacturers in the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s fifth piece of analysis on how the refurbishment of Grenfell contributed to the tragedy.
Click here to read Ron’s sixth piece analysing London Fire Brigade’s response.
Click here to read a legal take on the Report by Annie Davies at Addleshaw Goddard.
Inadequate planning, leadership and training at heart of poor response to Grenfell fire aftermath
Central and local government’s response during the week after the Grenfell Tower fire was “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal”, according to the public inquiry’s Phase Two report.
Ron Alalouff
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